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ABSTRACT 
 
Trade Union utility functions with discontinuities have 
started to gain popularity in the last few years. The main 
reason for this is the search for more embracing union utility 
functions. This paper attempts to fill an important gap in 
this literature by providing the choice theoretic foundations 
of such functions thereby widening their relevance and 
facilitating their application to other areas. The foundations 
can also be used as a basis for modelling sequential multi-
objective union utility functions.  
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I. Introduction 
The dominant specifications of union utility imply a well 
behaved continuous utilitarian or expected utility function. 
However, there is an increasing awareness among labour 
economists that these specifications of union utility 
functions are not unproblematic. For instance, Pencavel admits 
that "even with the focus so narrowed [mainly on wages and 
employment], there are serious analytical problems of 
specifying a well-defined union utility function" (Pencavel, 
1991,p.55). This awareness has already begun to make its 
impact in theoretical works on union utility with a tendency 
in the union literature to argue that the established union 
utility functions are mis-specified, and to search for more 
representative ones (see Flanagan,1993; Checchi and Lucifora, 
2002). An example is found in the more embracing union utility 
functions suggested for dealing with issues like wage rigidity 
and the insiders-outsiders problem (Oswald,1986; Carruth and 
Oswald,1987; Jones and McKenna,1989; Moene, Wallerstein and 
Hoel,1993; Drakopoulos and Skatun, 1997). The main thrust of 
these new specifications is that they employ a semi-strict 
quasi-concave union utility function with a discontinuity in 
the marginal rate of substitution which implies kinked 
indifference curves. These have started to acquire new 
credibility, although implied in older models like Cartter's 
(1959) political union.1  Furthermore, it has been shown   that 
                                                          
1 Cartter thought that there is very little substitution between wages and 
employment mainly because of the internal political pressures of the union. 
Cartter's view and generally the view that union indifference curves are 
kinked has been strengthened by a number of empirical studies on the 
elasticity of substitution between wages and employment. As Pencavel 
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these new specifications have considerable implications for 
the microeconomic theory of the trade union (including of 
course, the important issues of unemployment and wages).2 
 
Yet all these formulations are provided with little reference 
to their theoretical foundations. It seems that although 
authors have realized the need for new approaches to union 
utility, they have neglected the building blocks of these 
functions. This is a serious deficiency since the theoretical 
foundations (particularly those relating to the theory of 
choice) are essential for the credibility of the functions, 
for future similar work and for drawing out their wider 
significance.  
 
The aim of this paper is to suggest a general choice 
theoretical framework for these alternative union utility 
functions which will enhance their general relevance.  This 
theoretical basis also applies to the further development of 
older political models of the union which explicitly or 
implicitly suggest kinked union indifference curves. It is 
also argued that these foundations are a first step in 
formulating more complex and representative union utility 
functions for analysing unions more as organisations than 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
observes these studies "are consistent with Cartter's conjecture". For a 
review see Pencavel, 1991.  
2 The results include wage rigidity and employment phases in a boom period 
(see Oswald, 1986 and Carruth and Oswald,1987; Drakopoulos and katun,1997).  
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firms (e.g. Mayhew and Turnbull, 1989; Flanagan,1993).3 As will 
be seen the analysis also attempts to provide the basis for 
modelling a sequential multi-objective union utility such as 
the one implied in Reder (1952, 1960).4  Finally, by providing 
the foundations for a particular form of function, it is hoped 
that similar research on other types of union utility 
functions will be encouraged in a general attempt to tackle 
the widely acknowledged remaining analytical problems. 
 
 
 
II. Union Utility Functions With Discontinuities  
The standard union utility function which is used in the 
literature is basically an expected utility formulation which 
is equivalent to the assumption that the union is 
characterized by utilitarian principles (this is only true 
when union membership is fixed).  
 
  U = Nu(w) + (M-N)u(b)     (1) 
where u(.) is the utility function of an individual worker, M 
is the membership of the union, w is the wage rate, b is  
unemployment benefit (or an alternative wage), and N is 
employment. The union is assumed to maximize (1) subject to a 
profit constraint usually given as: 
π = pf(N) - wN  
                                                          
3The advocates of this view do not see the union primarily as a profit 
maximizing firm. Instead they emphasize the institutional framework and the 
collective choice process (Flanagan,1993)  
4 Reder suggested that unions rarely exploit their full bargaining power in 
a boom time, thus keeping a margin of reserve power for future bad periods. 
This is close to Simon's sequential satisficing approach (see also 
Simon,1982 and King,1990)  
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where π is profit, p is price and f(N) is a well-behaved 
production function (for a general discussion, see Booth,1995). 
This type of union utility function was first suggested by 
McDonald and Solow (1981) and is followed by many labour 
theorists (e.g. Ashenfelter and Brown, 1986; Grout, 1984). The 
above utility function implicitly assumes that there is 
continuous substitution between w and N across over the whole 
range of w and N. 
 
The first and the basic formulation of a union utility 
function which explicitly involves discontinuities was used by 
Oswald in 1986 in the process of explaining wage rigidity. 
Oswald utilizes some work in psychology to suggest two ideas: 
a) that there is an asymmetry between responses to "over-pay' 
and "under pay" and b) that there is an aspiration wage which 
is the level of pay which is seen as the fair amount or the 
norm, and which depends on past achievements or comparisons 
with the wage of other workers. Once this aspiration wage has 
been achieved, extra increases of wages provide less utility. 
The individual worker utility function is: 
 
  w   ∀  w ≥ w* 
 U =          (2) 
  σ(w-w*) + w* ∀  w < w* 
 
where w* is the aspiration wage and 1 > σ > 0. The next step is 
to incorporate these ideas into a union utility function, 
assuming a utilitarian union as a basis. 
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 U = N[min(0,(1-σ)(w*-w)) + w] + (M-N)u(b)  (3) 
 
This produces union indifference curves with a non-
differentiable kink at w = w*. In an efficient bargain with an 
isoprofit contour as a constraint, there will be equilibria in 
which product price changes leave w = w*.  
 
A similar formulation but in relation to the insiders-
outsiders problem, was suggested by Carruth and Oswald (1987). 
In particular, they maintain that the standard utilitarian 
function ignores the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders. Insiders have much more influence on union 
behaviour than outsiders, and this calls for a utility 
function which will be valid for the whole range of employment 
levels not just levels below or equal to the current 
membership. In other words equation 1 is mis-specified when 
employment is greater than membership. (The impact of their 
critique is gaining influence (e.g. Moene, Wallenstein and 
Hoel, 1993). Thus they write (1) in a general form as 
 
 U = Mu(w) + [u(b) - u(w)] max[0, M-N]   (4) 
 
Writing the above in the form of  equation  2, gives  
 
  Nu(w) + (M-N)u(b)  ∀ M ≥ N 
 U =          (5) 
  Mu(w)    ∀ M < N 
 
Union indifference curves will have a kink when M = N. 
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Jones and McKenna (1989) have expanded the above formulation 
to incorporate the idea that the union is more likely to care 
about employed outsiders, than about unemployed outsiders. 
This overcomes the difficulty with the original Carruth-Oswald 
formulation which produces an employment level that is at most 
equal to membership, and allows equilibrium above M when there 
is a rise in demand. Jones and McKenna use a formulation 
similar to (5) by adding to the second part the term: 
 
   Mu(w) + (N-M)qu(w)   ∀ M < N (6) 
 
q is the employed outsiders' probability of job retention. The 
union indifference curves here are still kinked but with a 
negative (rather than a horizontal) slope for M < N. 
 
Apart from the above, there are other examples which 
implicitly favour discontinuous substitution among union 
objectives. One case is Cartter's view that there might be 
very limited substitutability between wages and employment due 
to the internal political structures of the union (Cartter, 
1959 and for a modern version Mayhew and Turnbull, 1989; 
Drakopoulos and Skatun, 1997).  
 
 
III. Choice Theory Foundations 
It has been shown that all of the above formulations have 
important comparative static properties (see Jones and 
McKenna, 1989; Drakopoulos, 1996).  However, the presence of 
choice theory foundations would probably provide additional 
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theoretical validity, incorporate all the above variants, add 
generality and supply the basis for future applications. 
 
 
The basic idea of the above utility functions is that certain 
levels of variables are more important than, or have priority 
over other variables. In terms of choice theory this idea can 
be captured by a hierarchical system of preferences. There are 
two main types of hierarchical preferences: a) lexicographic 
and b) target setting (Drakopoulos, 1992). The target setting 
type is more relevant here because, unlike lexicography, it 
allows for degrees of substitution among union objectives. 
Target setting hierarchical choice involves the setting of 
targets in the sense that agents must reach a target (or 
threshold) of a variable before starting to consider 
alternatives. The basic formulation of this type of choice as 
applied to union behaviour is the following (for a general 
axiomatic discussion of hierarchical choice, see Georgescu-
Roegen, 1966, Day, 1971 and Encarnacion, 1983, Falkinger, 
1990).  
 
Taking the general case that there are a number of objectives, 
assume that each objective i has a variable zi which 
corresponds to it. It is also assumed that the numbering: 
 
 z1, z2, ... zn 
 
is such that the problem of choice is the following: 
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 max zn 
 s.t. 
 zi ≥ zi* (i = 1, 2, ..., n-1) 
 
where z*i is a constant and represents satisfactory levels of 
corresponding variables. In the case that the above has no 
solution, then the problem becomes: 
 
     max zn-1 
 s.t. 
 zi ≥ zi* (i = 1,2, ..., n-2) 
 
The least important objective is dropped. The same procedure 
is followed until a feasible problem is determined. In order 
to express these in utility terms, we need a utility function 
which will be a function that is defined over the z's and 
which would express union preferences. Corresponding to each 
objective i, a real-valued function is assumed ui = ui(zi) 
such that ui(xi) > ui(xi')  means that x is preferred to x' on 
the basis of that objective. It is also assumed that there 
exist particular values ui* = ui(zi*) where i = 1,2,... The 
zi* is a particular constraint level of zi. Thus the  union 
utility vector is: 
 
      u = (min[u1 (z1), u1*], min[u2(z2),u2*],...)    (7) 
 
In terms of preference theory, assume we have two vectors 
 
 x = (x1,x2,...xn) 
 x' = (x1', x2', ... xn') 
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then x P x' iff 
 
either 1) x* > x1 > x1' 
or  2) x1 = x1' < x1*; x2 > x2' 
or  3) x1' < x1* < x1 
or  4) x1* < x1, x1'; x2* > x2 > x2' 
               :         :          :     
       xn-1* < xn-1; xn-1'; xn > xn' 
 
With the above as a basis, it is desirable to give an example 
by taking a situation where the union has only two objectives, 
wages and employment (w,N). Following the basic formulation of 
the discontinuous approach (equations 2 and 3), w is set to be 
the dominant or the most important objective. Any situation 
can be represented by the vector: 
 
 v = (w,N) 
 
We symbolize the satisfactory level of wages with w*. This 
level could also be taken to be the "fair" wage (Akerlof and 
Yellen,1990) or in a Keynesian framework, the relative wage 
(e.g. Summers,1988; Frank, 1997). Now let us compare two 
situations: 
  
v' = (w',N') and v" = (w", N") 
 v' P v" iff 
 
either 1) w" < w' < w* 
or  2) w" = w' ≤ w*; N" < N' 
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or  3) w" < w* < w' 
or  4) w* < w", w'; N" < N' 
 
The above system of choice is a very simple but basic example. 
The general union utility function which is implied is two-
part function given as: 
U(w,w*,N) = {U1(w) , U2(w*,N)} where 
 
                    U1  for w < w* 
 U(w,w*,N) =                                     (8)  
                    U2 for w > w*  
 
It is clear that the above is not very realistic since the 
union places no emphasis on employment before the wage reaches 
the target level. (The derived union indifference curves will 
be L shaped with a kink at w*).  One can construct more 
realistic general hierarchical union utility functions which 
are nevertheless based on the above basic system. For 
instance, it can be argued that the union cares about 
employment even before the target wage has been reached. The 
utility function implied in this case is the following: 
 
U(w,w*,N) = {U1(w,N) , U2(w*,N)} where 
 
 
                      U1  for w < w* 
 U(w,w*,N) =                                    (9)    
                      U2 for w > w*  
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The derived union indifference curves will be as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Furthermore an example of the difference of this kind of 
indifference curves to the optimization problem of the union 
can be found in Drakopoulos, 1996. 
 
The same conceptual framework can be used to capture the 
formulations in the insiders-outsiders theme. The insiders-
outsiders idea as presented by Carruth and Oswald (1987) and 
Jones and McKenna (1989), assumes that the most important 
objective is full employment of all union members. The basic 
choice system can capture the relatively simpler approach of 
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Carruth and Oswald by substituting M (membership) in place of 
w*.  This modification can be easily incorporated in the basic 
choice system. In our framework, the basic utility function in 
the insiders-outsiders theme is the following: 
 
U(M,N,w) = {U1(M,N,w) , U2(M,w)} where 
 
                      U1  for M > N 
 U(w,M,N) =                                   (10)    
                      U2 for M < N  
 
The resulting union indifference curves will differ from those 
in figure 1 in the sense that the kink will be where N = M and 
there will be a horizontal segment for N > M. 
 
Thus all of the above formulations can be basically derived 
from equation (7). The important point of (7) and of the 
previous formulations is that the utility index U1 is higher 
than the utility index U2 up to the target level. It should be 
clear that the suggested two-part functions are of a general 
form. One could use any specific form (e.g. utilitarian, wage 
bill etc.) as long as the hierarchical element is preserved.  
 
Furthermore the choice system suggested can easily be adopted 
to represent and further develop explicit sequential or 
satisficing approaches to union utility (e.g. Reder, 1960). 
For instance, the starred variables can be viewed as the 
satisficing levels for the union. Our choice system can also 
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provide the starting point for a sequential multi-objective 
union utility function. Wages and employment could be the most 
important variables and the rest (hours of work, conditions of 
work etc.) would become important after satisfactory levels of 
these have been achieved. Clearly, this establishes a 
connection with the industrial relations literature, which 
some labour theorists regard as a desirable development (e.g. 
Mayhew and Turnbull, 1989). 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
There is a growing interest in the nature and specification of 
union utility functions among union theorists. This has become 
more apparent in the last few years when an increasing number 
of economists have started to appreciate the complex nature of 
union objectives. A direct result of this is the appearance of 
alternative union utility functions such as those implying 
kinked union indifference curves. These specifications were 
mainly drawn from an insiders-outsiders framework. This paper 
attempts to fill an important gap in this literature by 
providing the choice theoretic foundations of such functions 
thereby widening their relevance and facilitating their 
application to other areas. Furthermore, it was argued that 
these choice theoretic foundations could be used as a basis 
for exploring and developing alternative views on union 
behaviour. For instance, the suggested choice system could be 
the starting point for modelling a sequential multi-objective 
union utility function in the tradition of Reder (1952, 1960) 
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or the further development of the political union model such 
as that of Cartter (1959). Finally, one can see these 
foundations as a useful starting point for those who view the 
union from an organizational perspective. In general the 
proposed system provides a more realistic approach to 
understanding union utility functions and capturing the 
complex aspects of trade union behaviour.  
  
 
  
 16 
REFERENCES 
 
Akerlof, G. and Yellen, J. (1990)"The fair wage-effort 
hypothesis and unemployment", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
105, pp.255-84. 
  
Ashenfelter, O. and Brown, J. (1986) "Testing the efficiency 
of employment contracts", Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp 
40-87. 
 
Atherton, W. (1973) Theory of Union Bargaining Goals, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Booth, A. (1995) The Economics of the Trade Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cartter, A. (1959) Theory of Wages and Employment, Homewood: 
Irwin 
 
Carruth, A. and Oswald, A. (1987)"On union preferences and 
labour market models: insiders and outsiders", Economic 
Journal, 97, pp 431-445. 
 
Chipman, J. (1971)"On the lexicographic presentation of 
preference orderings", in Chipman et al Preferences, Utility 
and Demand, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Checchi , D and Lucifora, C. (2002) "Unions and labour market 
institutions in Europe",Economic Policy, 35, pp. 124-135. 
 
Day, R. (1971)"Rational choice and economic behaviour", Theory 
and Decision, 1, pp, 229-251. 
 
Drakopoulos, S.A. (1992)"Psychological thresholds, demand and 
price rigidity", Manchester School, 60, pp.152-68. 
 
Drakopoulos, S.A. (1996)"Towards a hierarchical approach to 
trade union Behaviour", Economic Notes, 25, pp. 47-56. 
 
Drakopoulos, S.A. and Skatun, J. (1997)"Altruism, union 
utility and outsiders", Journal of Economic Studies, 24, pp. 
393-401. 
 
Encarnacion, J. (1983) "Social values and individual choices", 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 4, pp 265-275. 
 
Falkinger, J. (1990) "On Growth along a Hierarchy of Wants", 
Metroeconomica 3, pp.209-33. 
 
Ferguson, C. (1958) "An Essay on Cardinal Utility", Southern 
Economic Journal, vol. XXV, pp.11-23. 
 
Flanagan, R. (1993)"Can political models predict union 
behaviour?" in R. Flanagan, K. Moene and M. Wallerstein, Trade 
 17 
Union Behaviour, Pay Bargaining and Economic Performance, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
 
Frank, R. (1997) "The frame of reference as a public good", 
Economic Journal; 107, pp.1832-1847. 
 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1966) Analytical Economics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Grout, P. (1984)"Investment and wages in the absence of 
legally binding labour contracts: a Nash bargaining approach", 
Econometrica, 52, pp 449-66. 
 
Jones, S. and McKenna, C. (1989)"The effect of outsiders on 
union contracts", European Economic Review, 33 pp 1567-73. 
 
King, J. (1990) Labour Economics, London: Macmillan 
 
Mayhew, K. and Turnbull, P. (1989)"Models of union behaviour: 
A Critique of recent literature", in R. Drago and R. Perlman 
(eds), Microeconomic Issues at Labour Economics, London: 
Harvester  Wheatsheaf. 
 
McDonald, I. and Solow, R. (1981)"Wage bargaining and 
employment", American Economic Review, 71, pp 896-908. 
 
Moene, K., Wallerstein, and M. Hoel (1993) "Bargaining 
structure and economic performance" in R. Flanagan, K. Moene 
and M. Wallerstein, Trade Union Behaviour, Pay Bargaining and 
Economic Performance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Oswald, A. (1986) "Is wage rigidity caused by 'lay-offs by 
seniority'?", in W. Beckerman (ed.), Wage Rigidity and 
Unemployment, London, Duckworth. 
 
Pencavel, J. (1991) Labor Markets under Trade Unionism, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Reder, A. (1952) "The Theory of Trade Union Wage Policy", 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 34, pp.34-45. 
 
Reder, M.(1960)"Job scarcity and the nature of union power", 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 13, pp.349-62. 
 
Simon, H. (1982) Models of Bounded Rationality, Cambridge 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
Summers, L. (1988) Relative wages, efficiency wages, and 
Keynesian unemployment, American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 78, pp.383-88. 
 
 
